You will see this type of analysis often over the next few days, but I wanted to comment on it from the strategical side. To sum up: here is a list of the pitchers taken first overall in the draft with their win totals in the majors:

Luke Hochevar (2006) zero–he is underperforming in the minors to date with an ERA over 4.
Bryan Bullington (2002) zero.
Matt Anderson (1997) 15 wins
Kris Benson (1996) 68 wins
Paul Wilson (1994) 40 wins
Brien Taylor (1991) zero wins
Ben McDonald (1989) 78 wins
Tim Belcher (1983) 146 wins
Mike Moore (1981) 161 wins(who incidentally was one of my favorite players and led me to one of my early championships in rotisserie baseball)
Floyd Bannister (1976) 134 wins

There are some interesting items. Note that though McDonald and Wilson have relatively meager win totals, these win totals are far better than would be expected for any other draft position. Also, the performance of the first three guys on the list would clearly be worth a first overall pick if you somehow “knew” that you would get between 130-160 wins. I think that some people think that the first overall pick is where you might get a Hall of Fame type player, but that is not what is to be expected.

But also note that no pitcher taken first in the last 20 years has done well. There may be a reason for this that goes beyond analysis of the individual pitcher, and implicates the decision making process that leads to a player’s coronation as the top overall pick.

The last twenty years has seen a proliferation of baseball analysts. There are certainly more draft and minor league experts around now than there were 20 years ago; and about this there can be no serious debate. So we have more and more analysts around. Normally, one would think that with more analysts comes more diversity of opinion. Common sense might lead one to this conclusion, and certainly conventional wisdom might lead one to this belief. But game theory has a different opinion.

When faced with a large number of possible choices, what does one do?? To borrow from John Maynard Keynes, lets look at a beauty pageant, but lets assume there are hundreds of participants not just 50. The judges are trying to pick “the most beautiful.” But this is a loose standard, and is certainly not the same as picking the tallest or the one with the longest legs (desirable though those categories may be). So what occurs is that in an effort to cull through the masses, a focus is made on a distinguishing feature, and what you end up with are models that are not perfectly beautiful but that usually have one striking feature.

In baseball that feature is usually either fastball speed, college success or projectability, or some other factor. But these factors, while important, are much more akin to picking “the most beautiful” than picking the tallest. Such uncertainty is fraught with peril. The fact is that this one characteristic exists not only draws attention to itself, but also may be the reason for success against inferior competition and will not hold up against more adaptable and talented opposition. This is a slender reed indeed upon which to base such a weighty decision.

The fact that there are more analysts than ever is also a significant variable. Much like stock analysts there are two types of analysts. The first group consists of those with a reputation; their interest is in preserving their reputation. So if their opinion is vastly different from the consensus they damn well better be right. But the mere fact that their opinion on something as rigorously followed and publicized as the number one overall pick in the draft will be publicized means that there is less incentive to take a risk. So, for this group of analysts we see a “snowball” effect, and opinion will converge around one player so that each individual acting in his self interest to be risk-averse winds up as part of the general consensus. This may (or may not) have little bearing on the actual skill of the player. If they are wrong they can comfort their detractors by pointing out that everyone else was also.

Proof of this is from last years draft; Tim Lincecum was regarded as possibly having the best overall stuff, but there were concerns about his size and workload. Given that there is extra perceived risk, by consensus, in taking this type of player he drops overall. No one wants to be the only guy who drafted or recommended Lincecum to go number one when no one else does and then see him get hurt or shellacked.

The second camp consists of exactly the type of analyst that WILL pick a Lincecum or a non-consensus pick. Generally this will be people looking to make a name for themselves or those outside the establishment. They may not be right, and probably won’t, but if they are they can make a name for themselves. Perhaps the greatest example of this was pollster John Zogby, who made a name for himself by predicting that the Clinton/Dole presidential election would be a lot closer than what the conventional polls predicted. He was right and has been living off of his one correct prediction for years.

Of course, I am not saying that you should never take a pitcher with the first overall pick, far from it. However, if you do make sure it is because you really think he is the best player. The Twins are reaping the benefit of their choice of bucking the conventional wisdom, whether it was for signability reasons or not (and given their track record I am more than willing to give them the benefit of the doubt).

The final factor is the fact that there is no benefit to be gained right now in being correct. But there is plenty of criticism that can be laid on the analyst or drafter right now. If the Rays drafted Matt Wieters first there will be much obloquy cast upon them; just look at what happened to the Twins when they passed up Prior (though I will say “touche” should someone bring up Matt Bush–though no one should suggest that the Padres are as astute as the Twins). So they pay a current penalty now, namely a loss of reputation, if they are wrong. But the payoff to being right, if one even occurs, is two years away at least in most cases. By that time there are plenty more opportunities to prove oneself right, so there is little incentive other than pride or courage, to bucking the opinion of the masses of analysts.

When Belcher, Moore and Bannister were taken there was not only not nearly as much publicity about the draft, there was much less analysis, much less talk leading up to the draft and less discussion. There were no chats, no blogs, no internet and no public dissection by the masses. Hence there was less of a penalty to be paid in the short term. Of course, we do not know what is going on in an individual’s mind and this is the only way to really know what has happened. However, we can and do know how collections of people will act, be they baseball writers and analysts or not.